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I. INTRODUCTION
Public sentiment regarding the violent nature of America’s adolescents has
reached a boiling point.1 Critics contend that the youth of today are not just
committing more crimes, but that their very nature has somehow changed in the past
twenty to thirty years from mischievous, young troublemakers to violent hardened
criminals.2 As a result of such hasty categorizations, our vocabulary includes all new
phrases such as “superpredators,”3 “youth violence epidemic,”4 and “violent new
breed.”5
1

Timothy W. Maier & Michael Rust, A Decline in Crime?, INSIGHT MAG., Apr. 27, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 9105395.
2

143 CONG. REC. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).

3

Bernadine Dohrn & Steven Drizin, A Second Chance: Juvenile Delinquents Who
Transformed Themselves and History, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL
2849407.
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State policy-makers have responded to such public opinions by enacting
legislation that makes it easier to try juveniles as adults.6 These statutes were
intended to make sentences longer and more harsh, insuring deterrence and
retribution for young offenders, and increased safety for society.7 Since 1992, fortyseven states have adjusted their laws, in one way or another, to deal with the threat of
juvenile crime.8 Of these states, forty have specifically lowered the requirements to
transfer a juvenile to adult court.9
Ohio’s new juvenile transfer statute became effective in 1996.10 This enactment
lowered the age at which the state may transfer a juvenile to adult court from fifteen
to fourteen-years-old, and broadened the situations in which transfer is mandatory.11
The Federal government responded similarly by changing its laws in 1994,
making it possible to transfer a thirteen-year-old to adult court.12 Additionally,
legislation has been recently proposed that would make states eligible for federal
funding based upon enactment of laws mandating transfer of fifteen-year-olds to
adult courts for certain offenses.13 Other federal legislative proposals suggest that
there be fewer restrictions on incarcerating juveniles with adults.14
The response of the states and the Federal Government in enacting tougher
juvenile laws was inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, evidence indicates
that the rate of juvenile crime has been decreasing dramatically for the last several

4

DeWayne Wickham, To Save Country, Save Kids from Violence, AIDS, USA TODAY,
May 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5725647.
5

Fox Butterfield, Guns Are Blamed for ‘80s Rise in Teen Homicides “The Kids’ DNA Has
Not Changed,” NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL
16080581.
6

Ron Martz, Juvenile Crime Wave May Be Just a Ripple, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16080580.
7

Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 374 (1998).
8
Steven J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 16
(1997).
9

PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER
PROVISIONS iii (1998).
10

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (West 1998).

11

Id.

12

Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer Statutes Just an Easy
Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 1007 (1995).
13
William Raspberry, GOP Cynicism on Juvenile Crime, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Sept. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16066142.
14

James S. Russell, AIA, Detention Facilities: Locking Them Up Is Getting Tough the
Best Way to Approach Prison Design? Or Should Facilities Respond to the Needs of the
Populations Being Detained?, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Dec. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL
9811247.
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years,15 thereby eliminating the justifications for harsher penalties. Second, treating
juveniles as adults ignores the cognitive, emotional, and developmental differences
between these two age groups,16 resulting in laws that do not protect society nor deter
or rehabilitate our young offenders. Finally, strict provisions that completely remove
judicial discretion and mandate transfer by statute may result in an unreasonably
harsh sentence for an undeserving offender.
This Note takes a closer look at the problems associated with transferring
juveniles to adult court by focusing on Ohio’s juvenile transfer statute.17 Part II
begins with an analysis of the history of the juvenile court, including its
establishment and evolution throughout time.18 It also includes an analysis of how
the common interpretation of the original approach to juvenile crime has created an
overly narrow view of how to deal with the problem today.19 Part III examines the
latest crime statistics that reveal a significant drop in juvenile crime.20 This section
also explores various alternative explanations for the apparent rise in juvenile crime
during certain periods in the last twenty years.21 Part IV summarizes the cognitive,
emotional, and developmental differences between juveniles and adults that justify a
separate system for our young offenders.22 Part V analyzes the different methods
used to transfer juveniles to adult courts, including waiver, direct file, statutory
exclusion, and “once an adult, always an adult” provisions.23 Part VI outlines the
1996 changes made to Ohio’s transfer statute for both discretionary and mandatory
transfer.24 Part VII points out the problems associated with Ohio’s transfer statute
and brings to light inadequacies common to most state statutes that make juvenile
transfer easier.25 It also explores possible alternatives to transfer, including a
proposal by the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission that suggests eliminating
transfer and giving the juvenile court judge the ability to impose adult sentences.26
Altogether, the most important message is that policy must be the product of well
informed decision-making rather than merely a response to public outrage at

15

David Westphal, Murder Takes a Holiday: Violent Crime Rate Falls Again in U.S.,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22726204.
16
Elizabeth S. Scott, et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222 (1995).
17

See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.

18

See discussion infra Part II.

19

See discussion infra Part II.

20

See discussion infra Part III.

21

See discussion infra Part III.

22

See discussion infra Part IV.

23

See discussion infra Part V.

24

See discussion infra Part VI.

25

See discussion infra Part VII.

26

Mark Tatge, Convicted 10-Year-Olds Could Face Prison Terms, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Dec. 24, 1998, at 1A.
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statistics that are largely blown out of proportion.27 Adolescents are different than
adults, and laws must reflect consideration of what makes them different if any goals
of punishment are to be achieved.28
II. THE ORIGINS OF JUVENILE COURT
There are great differences of opinion regarding the proper goals of a juvenile
court system and the most effective ways to accomplish them. The following
sections describe how this country has, at different stages of our history,
experimented with different policies and procedures with respect to juveniles. Each
section will explore different explanations for what may have been the driving force
behind reform and how the juvenile justice system developed through time evolving
into the system we have today.
A. The Traditional Approach
A history of the American Juvenile Justice System can be summarized in two
phases. During the first phase, the “Progressives” formed the original juvenile court
100 years ago, founded upon the goals of treatment and rehabilitation.29 This was
accomplished through informal procedures where the juvenile court judge had
abundant discretion regarding what was best for the child.30 The second phase
occurred in the 1960s, when the Supreme Court changed the whole nature of the
system by granting juveniles procedural due process rights.31 The result was a more
punitive system that totally resembled the adult criminal court.32
At common law, children over seven years old were treated as adults.33 The child
was subjected to “arrest, trial, and in theory, to punishment like adult offenders”
because the state was not thought to have the authority to grant juveniles different
procedural protections.34
A new movement, begun by the Progressives in the late 1800s, sought to treat
juveniles differently than adults.35 Their philosophy was that delinquency was more
the result of social ills, such as poverty, rather than the child’s moral depravity.36
Treatment and rehabilitation became the strategy in dealing with this group of
individuals.37 Punishment was reserved only for those who were old enough to be

27

See discussion infra Part III.

28

See discussion infra Part IV.

29

Beatty, supra note 12, at 981.

30

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

31

Beatty, supra note 12, at 986.

32

Beatty, supra note 12, at 984-85.

33

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).

34

Id.

35

Beatty, supra note 12, at 981.

36

Beatty, supra note 12, at 981.

37

Beatty, supra note 12, at 981.
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held fully responsible for their wrongs.38 This movement led to the establishment of
the first juvenile court in Illinois one hundred years ago.39
In juvenile court, when a child was suspected of committing a crime, the juvenile
court would determine whether he or she was delinquent instead of guilty.40 This
was a civil proceeding without the “rigidity of the adult criminal system.”41 The
state, acting within its parens patriae capacity, was seeking to treat and not to punish
the young offender; consequently, there was no need for procedural protections.42
Additionally, there were no lawyers present,43 and the judge, instead of being trained
in the law,44 was to be versed in the subject of child welfare.45
An intended benefit of juvenile court proceedings was less formality.46 This
afforded the judge flexibility to take into consideration the individual differences in
each case and evaluate the needs of each young offender in accordance with the
judge’s own discretion.47 An unintended effect of the juvenile court system was that
over the years following its inception, the original goal of treatment slowly gave way
to punishment.48 By the 1960s, the purpose of the juvenile court seemed to mirror
that of the adult criminal court; however, procedural protections remained
nonexistent.49 What had formed was a “gap between the originally benign
conception of the system and its realities.”50
The Supreme Court, confronted with the unfairness of a juvenile system aimed at
punishment without providing procedural protections, began affording some
safeguards in Kent v. United States in 1966.51 However, with these procedural
38

Beatty, supra note 12, at 981.

39

Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 324 (1991).
40
RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 692 (2d ed. 1990).

AND THE

MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:

41

Id. at 693.

42

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).

43

REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 692.

44

REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 692.

45

Klein, supra note 7, at 377.

46

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

47

Susan R. Bell, Comment & Casenote, Ohio Gets Tough on Juvenile Crime: An Analysis
of Ohio's 1996 Amendments Concerning the Bindover of Violent Juvenile Offenders to the
Adult System and Related Legislation, 66 U. CIN L. REV. 207, 209 (1997).
48

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

49

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

50

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).

51

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966).
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of the juvenile courts,
studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual
performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
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safeguards came a shift in focus from the individual offender to the underlying
offense that was committed.52 The obvious result was even less focus on treatment
and rehabilitation.
At the age of 16 and while still on probation, Morris Kent was apprehended by
the police for housebreaking, robbery, and rape.53 After two days and more than
twelve hours of interrogation, he admitted to the alleged crimes as well as other
similar offenses.54 His mother was informed of his arrest the day after Kent was
apprehended.55 Her lawyer promptly objected to him being tried in adult court.56
For one week after Kent’s initial arrest, there was no arraignment or
determination of probable cause.57 Kent’s attorney made several motions, including
one for access to his social service file, all of which were never ruled on by the
court.58 The judge transferred the case to U.S. District Court after conducting a
purported “full investigation.”59 The sentence Kent received was thirty to ninety
years in prison.60 The U.S. Supreme Court, stating that “the admonition to function
in a parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness,” held that a
hearing is necessary before juvenile court jurisdiction may be waved.61 The Court
also held that counsel is entitled access to records, and the juvenile court judge must
state the reasons underlying the transfer to adult court.62 Finally, in the appendix to
the opinion, the Court listed a number of factors a judge should consider before
transferring a case to adult court.63 Such factors include the nature of the offense
(seriousness, violent), type of offense (against person or property), prosecutive merit,
maturity of the offender, previous record, and amenability to rehabilitation.64
A more profound procedural change in the juvenile system occurred one year
later in In re Gault.65 Unbeknownst to his mother, Gerald Francis Gault was taken
into custody for making phone calls to a neighbor, Mrs. Cook, of the “irritatingly

immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to
adults. Id.
52

Beatty, supra note 12, at 985.

53

Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.

54

Id. at 544.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 550.

61

Id. at 555.

62

Id. at 555-57.

63

Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.

64

Id.

65

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”66 At an informal hearing, no one was sworn in,
there was no sign of Mrs. Cook, no counsel, and no transcript;67 furthermore, the
Gaults did not receive notice of his hearing until two months later.68 After Gerald
was questioned, the judge said he would think about the situation, and then
proceeded to send him back to a detention facility for four more days.69 At the next
hearing, at which Mrs. Cook was also not present, Gerald was sentenced to six years
at a state industrial school.70
In response to this “unbridled discretion,” the Supreme Court awarded
substantive due process rights to Gerald and future offenders involved in juvenile
proceedings.71 These protections include the right to notice of charges, counsel,
confrontation, privilege against self-incrimination, cross-examination, appellate
review, and a transcript of the proceedings.72
This case marked a dramatic shift in juvenile law because the proceedings came
to resemble a regular criminal trial.73 They had become formal criminal proceedings,
with a focus on the offense and punishment, instead of informal, civil proceedings
focused on the individual offender and the treatment best suited for his or her
particular needs.74
The trend to grant procedural protections continued in In re Winship.75 This case
involved a juvenile who was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months in a
training school, subject to six years of annual extensions, for stealing $112 from a
woman’s locker.76 His guilt was determined only by a preponderance of evidence.77
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile is on trial for a criminal
charge, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.78
The Supreme Court made one final step in its move to make the juvenile court
identical to the adult court in 1975.79 In Breed v. Jones, the juvenile was
apprehended for armed robbery.80 While he was detained, the juvenile court held

66

Id. at 4.

67

Id. at 5.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 6.

70

Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.

71

Id. at 17.

72

Id. at 31-59.

73

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

74

Beatty, supra note 12, at 983.

75

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

76

Id. at 360.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 365.

79

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).

80

Id. at 521.
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several hearings.81 At the dispositional hearing, Breed was found unfit for treatment
as a juvenile and transferred to adult court where he was tried again.82 Despite the
fact that he was never truly sentenced in juvenile court, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the juvenile was twice put in jeopardy when he was sent to the adult court to be
tried again.83 The Court stated that “the purpose of the Double Jeopardy clause is to
require that he be subject to the experience only once for the same offence.”84
In an opinion reflecting a desire to maintain at least one aspect of the informal
juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, refused to
extend the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings.85 The Court felt it would
become too adversarial and would completely cripple the judge’s flexibility in
determining the proper punishment for individual offenders.86
In sum, history shows that the lofty goals of the original juvenile advocates were
forever changed when the Supreme Court decided to grant procedural protections to
juveniles; however, this interpretation raises questions as to how procedural
safeguards (even if identical to those of the adult criminal court) changed the whole
philosophy from treatment to punishment. Conversely, history demonstrates that the
focus underlying the juvenile court may actually have changed before the Supreme
Court decided to grant juveniles such protections. It remains unclear, however, as to
why society turned away from reforming its wayward youths. The following two
sections will point to other forces that may have pushed this change in philosophy
and explore the possibility that procedural informality was not necessary to maintain
the identity of the juvenile court.87
B. The Cyclical Approach
Authors Jeffrey M. Jenson and Mathew O. Howard maintain that the juvenile
justice policy has repeatedly gone in cycles from the goal of rehabilitation to
punishment, starting in 1825 with the New York House of Refuge.88 This institution
was created upon the belief that juveniles should be treated differently than adult
criminals and separated from them in their own system of rehabilitation.89 As
society began to feel that this approach was too lenient, institutions like the House of
Refuge evolved into places resembling adult prisons with little emphasis on
rehabilitation.90
81

Id. at 521-25.

82

Id. at 524.

83

Id. at 541.

84

Breed, 421 U.S. at 530.

85

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).

86

REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 40, at 694.

87

See discussion infra Parts B, C.

88

See Jeffrey M. Jenson & Matthew O. Howard, Youth Crime, Public Policy, and Practice
in the Juvenile Justice System: Recent Trends and Needed Reforms, SOC. WORK, July 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 15542036.
89

Id.

90

Id.
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According to Jenson and Howard, another movement emerged in the late 1800s
resulting in the establishment of the first juvenile court in Illinois in 1899.91 Its goals
of reform were similar to those that led to the creation of the House of Refuge.92
Over a period of sixty years, society began to feel that this system was “ineffective in
reducing crime” and unfair in that it did not afford juveniles the same legal rights as
adult criminals.93
In 1966, the Supreme Court began a third reform movement, based upon the
belief that “the child receives the worst of both worlds. . . neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.”94 Beginning with Kent v. United States, the Court decided a series of
cases granting procedural due process rights to juveniles.95 At the same time,
smaller, less restrictive, community-based institutions became the alternative to the
large, overcrowded, and ineffective custodial institutions.96 Underlying this reform
were the goals of treatment, rehabilitation, and decriminalization of delinquency.97
As a result of an increase in violent juvenile crime in the mid-1980s and early
1990s, and a perception that this country is too easy on its juveniles, the focus has
again changed back to punitive sanctions in the form of harsher sentences and easier
transfers to adult courts.98 Jenson and Howard argue that history shows that proper
policy should have a balanced focus between “prevention, rehabilitation, and
punishment.”99 A focus on only one of these goals has repeatedly led to
unimpressive results.100
C. The Real Reformers
The foregoing sections of this Note have expounded on the position that the early
reform movements that brought about the New York House of Refuge and the first
juvenile court were periods of benevolent social change with regard to juvenile
justice.101 Numerous scholarly commentaries support this position.102 Author
91

Id.

92

Id.

93

See Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

94

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).

95

See Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

96

Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

97

Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

98

Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

99

Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

100

Jenson & Howard, supra note 88.

101

See discussion supra Parts II A, B.

102
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). “The early reformers were appalled by adult
procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences
and mixed in jail with hardened criminals.” Id. See also Beatty, supra note 12, at 985; Florst
& Blomquist, supra note 39, at 325; Klein, supra note 7, at 376; Bell, supra note 47, at 209;
Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of
Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case study of Texas 1973-1995, 230 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 564
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Sanford J. Fox takes the opposite view, arguing that the original reformers,
beginning with those that founded the House of Refuge in 1825, may not have been
the “child savers”103 as they are remembered today.104
The New York House of Refuge, initially a homeless shelter for poor children,
developed into an institution designed to intervene in the lives of young offenders
and to isolate those convicted of minor offenses from the corrupting influences of
adult offenders.105 The main focus in 1825 was on those charged with minor
offenses who could still be saved.106 Those convicted of more serious offenses were
treated as adults.107
There were some negative sides to this institution as well. Because of the
conditions that existed on the inside, juries often would rather let a child go free than
send him away to the House of Refuge.108 Further, severe corporal punishments and
little or no religious expression for non-Protestants were common.109
Fox demonstrates that the goals the reformers so outwardly promoted were
neither unique to the juvenile justice system, nor were they always realized in
practice.110 Thirty years before the House of Refuge was established, retribution was
replaced by the goals of deterrence and reformation in all areas of criminal justice.111
As an alternative to corporal punishment, the homeless and criminals were locked up
for their own well being.112 Prisons soon became overcrowded and rioting
occasionally resulted.113 The House of Refuge was part of a larger response to
society’s displeasure for the entire system, and its feelings that it actually promoted
crime.114 The solution was to create institutions where life was uncomfortable and
treatment was severe in hopes that it would further deter criminal acts and “possibly
motivate the poor out of their poverty.”115 Courts ignored the real nature of these
institutions so long as the “declared purposes were morally and socially
acceptable.”116
(Special Issue: Juvenile Justice and the Criminal Law 1996); Jacqueline Cuncannan, Note,
Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children, 51 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 273, 278 (1997).
103

Bell, supra note 47, at 208.

104

See generally Fox, supra note 5.

105

Fox, supra note 5, at 1189.

106

Fox, supra note 5, at 1189.

107

Fox, supra note 5, at 1189.

108

Fox, supra note 5, at 1194.

109

Fox, supra note 5, at 1196.

110

Fox, supra note 5, at 1196.

111

Fox, supra note 5, at 1196.

112

Fox, supra note 5, at 1196.

113

Fox, supra note 5, at 1197.

114

Fox, supra note 5, at 1197.

115

Fox, supra note 5, at 1200.

116

Fox, supra note 5, at 1206.
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Fox also contends that there are myths concerning the real purpose behind the
creation of the first juvenile court.117 The 1899 Juvenile Court Act contained a
provision that referred to “care, custody and discipline.”118 The traditional approach
to history interprets this as proof of this court’s non-punitive, protectionist
philosophy.119 In fact, that philosophy was never expressly stated, and the words
“care, custody and discipline” merely referred to placing deviant children in foster
homes rather than larger institutions.120
Finally, Fox contends that the creation of the first juvenile court was not a push
to change juvenile court procedures.121 Before 1899, juveniles were tried in inferior
courts with the same type of informality and lack of procedural protections that are
so often accredited to the first juvenile court.122 In fact, courts were finding that
children were being sent to reform schools based on broad statutes and too much
discretion that infringed on the constitutional rights of the child.123
The theory underlying the traditional approach is the idea that procedural
informality is essential to maintaining the goal of rehabilitation in the juvenile
system. This narrow view of the function of the juvenile court has resulted in a lack
of experimentation with juvenile court procedures. Consequently, transfer to adult
court, where all protections were available, was perceived as the only way to make
serious offenders truly accountable for their actions. A closer look at the history of
the juvenile court reveals that procedural informality may not have been intended or
even necessary to achieving a rehabilitative goal. With this in mind, policy makers
are free to explore the possibility of combining procedural fairness with
rehabilitation.
To develop sound policy, a close, realistic look at the problem is absolutely
necessary. This requires an examination of the state of juvenile crime today,
specifically, a look at whether juvenile crime really is worse than it was twenty years
ago.
III. JUVENILE CRIME TODAY
The murders, robbers, rapists, and drug dealers of yesteryear were
typically adults. Now they are typically juveniles. As the age of these
criminal predators becomes younger with each passing year, so does the
age of their victims . . . . The rate at which juveniles 14 to 17 years old
were arrested for murder grew by twenty two percent from 1990 to 1994
and the problem is going to get worse, much worse. . . . We now have a
new category of offenders that requires a different, tougher approach. In
short, we have criminals in our midst-young criminals-not juvenile
117

Fox, supra note 5, at 1211.

118

Fox, supra note 5, at 1211.

119
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pranksters and truants. . . . The legislation introduced today takes a
common sense approach in dealing with the current epidemic of juvenile
violence. It would help the states make urban, suburban, and rural
communities safe once again.124
Sensational speakers, like Senator Ashcroft above, and isolated instances, such as
the murder of fellow students and teacher by eleven and thirteen-year-old boys125
lend to the current paranoia regarding the level of juvenile crime today.126 The
typical reaction of harsher penalties and adult trials seems to be consistent among
policy makers.127 This section examines the facts of juvenile crime in the last twenty
years. It explores the increase in juvenile crime during the late 1980s and early
1990s and its subsequent decrease since that period. It will also show the causes of
the misperceived rate of juvenile crime today and some alternative explanations for
the apparent jump in juvenile crime during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
analysis will demonstrate that despite instances like the school shooting in
Columbine High School, the crime problem among this group of offenders may not
be as severe as it seems.
A. Statistical Analysis
The FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Crime Victimization Survey, and Bureau of
Justice statistics indicate a jump in violent juvenile crime between the early 1970s
and early 1990s.128 During this period, non-homicide offenses significantly
increased.129 The rate of robbery increased sixty-four percent for young offenders
aged sixteen to nineteen.130 For that same age group, there was thirty-two percent
increase in aggravated assault as well as a rise in simple assault.131 The amount of
rape offenses committed by offender’s aged thirteen to seventeen increased by thirtytwo percent from 1980 to 1992.132
When non-homicide offenses such as rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are
combined with homicide, a broader picture of the overall juvenile crime problem is
presented. The National Criminal Victimization Survey, produced by the United
States Department of Justice, shows that the number of offenders ages twelve to

124
Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act, 143 CONG. REC. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (emph. added).
125
David Brauer & John McCormick, The Boys Behind the Ambush, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6,
1998, at 20.
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Martz, supra note 6.
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GRIFFIN, supra note 9, at iii.
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LAURA RACHUBA ET AL., Violent Crime in the United States: An Epidemiologic Profile,
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MED., Sept. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
12079193.
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seventeen was 921,000 in 1973 dropping to all time low of 618,000 in 1986.133 The
rate then increased dramatically in 1993 to 1,108,000 offenders.134 The number of
offenders ages eighteen and over increased as well over this twenty-year period,135
revealing that crime for all ages was on the rise.
The statistics that require the most attention are the homicide rates. They have
shown the most dramatic variations over the last twenty years and are the most
accurately measured criminal offense.136 For offenders age fifteen through nineteen,
the homicide rate rose two hundred twenty percent between 1970 through 1991.137
From 1986, the year of the least amount of violent crime, through 1993, the year
with the worst showing, the rate of juvenile homicide tripled.138 The Bureau of
Justice statistics maps out juvenile homicide offending rates per 100,000 starting in
1976.139 For offenders aged fourteen to seventeen, the homicide offending rate
increased from 10.2 to 30.2 in 1993.140
All of these statistics show that what Senator Ashcroft and other sensationalists
said about a surge in violent crime were partially correct. What seriously
undermines the Senator’s speech to the President in 1997 is the fact that there was an
eighteen percent drop in overall juvenile crime between 1994 and 1996.141 For
crimes of rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and homicide combined, the number of
offenders also dropped drastically in 1994.142 This trend continued into 1997 when,
aside from the five year span in the late 1980s, the number of offenders fell to the
lowest level since 1973.143
The declining rate of homicides since 1994 is even more impressive. For
offenders under fourteen years of age, the homicide offending rate is the same as it
was twenty years ago, with very little, if any variation over the years.144 For
offenders aged fourteen to seventeen, however, the offending rate has varied
substantially in twenty years.145 In 1976, the rate of juveniles aged fourteen to
133
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (1997) (visited
Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/offage.txt>.
134

Id.

135

Id.
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U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (visited Dec.
28, 1998) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/oage.txt>.
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RACHUBA, supra note 128, at 953.
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Fox Butterfield, Guns Are Blamed for “80s Rise in Teen Homicides ‘The Kids’ DNA
Has Not Changed,” NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL
16080581.
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seventeen who committed homicide was 10.6 per 100,000 juveniles. This rose to
12.9 in 1980, dropped to an all time low of 8.5 in 1984, and increased dramatically
every year until the number was 30.2 in 1993.146 Many policy-makers focus on the
period between 1984 and 1993 when pushing for tougher laws.147 The problem is
that homicide rates may be misinterpreted if the only comparison is between the year
with the highest rate of homicides and the year with the lowest.148 A look at a larger
span of time will reveal the fact that crime goes in cycles149 and that the number of
homicide offenders in 1997 was almost half the number in 1993.150
The perception of increased juvenile violence has persisted despite the fact that
statistics tell us differently.151 An explanation for this may be that society is simply
more privy to information concerning tragic events across the country. Intense
media coverage of horrible, but isolated instances is presented with gory detail in
newspapers, magazines, and news television programs almost immediately after they
occur.152 As a result of this coverage, the public believes that the real world reflects
what the media presents.153 The President spoke of these events in his State of the
Union address: “Last year we were horrified and heartbroken by the tragic killings in
Jonesboro, Paducah, Pearl, Edinboro, [and] Springfield.”154
B. The Perception of Rising Juvenile Crime
The statistics previously discussed demonstrate that crime goes in cycles and that
focusing on one particular period of time will produce an inaccurate picture of the
real state of the problem. However, the reason behind increased crime rates during
certain periods, particularly the late 1980s and early 1990s has yet to be explored.
The following are alternative explanations for the seemingly uncontestable rise in
juvenile crime during that period. The following arguments will address the role of
firearms, police practices, and drugs on the overall juvenile crime rate.
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ZIMRING, supra note 132, at 34.

148
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150
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See RACHUBA, supra note 128.
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Adam Rogers, Anatomy of a Massacre, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 25. This article
takes you step by step through the murders at Columbine High School, including the last
words of the dying, as well as pictures and stories of each students killed. It also includes a
diagram of the school and pictures and descriptions of the weapons used. John Leland, The
Secret Life of Teens, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1999, at 44. This article was published the
following week and was also the cover story. Sue Anne Pressley, Student, 15, Wounds 6 at
Georgia High School, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 21, 1999, at 1A. The words “Oh, my
God, I’m so scared” were printed in large bolded type and underlined just above the title of the
article on the front page.
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STATE OF THE UNION: Clinton's Speech Looks Ahead to New Millenium, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2122331.
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Of the four violent crimes, homicide, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery, only
the first two have really shown to have increased during the period from the mid1980s to the early 1990s, according to Franklin E. Zimring, author of American
Youth Violence.155 Rape and robbery committed by juveniles, on the other hand,
have consistently fluctuated up and down in small variations over many years.156
The rise in homicide rates from 1976 to 1996 present a different problem. “The
most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide was an escalating volume
of fatal attacks with firearms. . . .”157 During the same period of time, the amount of
murders committed without a firearm remained stable;158 therefore, the rise in total
homicides is directly related to the rise in murders committed with a gun.159
This does not, however, signify a more violent type of offender.160 Nor does it
show that the amount of attacks have significantly increased, or that the intentions of
the perpetrator have become more evil.161 Actually, a very small portion of juvenile
offenders began to use guns during that time.162 As a result of the increase in the
likelihood of death when a gun is used, a very small number of offenders raised the
total number of homicides.163 The steady rate of knife related homicides further
supports the claim that juveniles are not more violent today.164
Finally, aggravated assaults have increased dramatically along with the number
of homicides.165 At first this does not seem to go well with the argument that a small
group of juveniles have simply changed their weapon of choice. But, as Zimring
suggests, “the increasing arrest rates in the younger age bracket for assault was not a
change in the behavior of young offenders but a change in the classification of
attacks that are close to the line that separates simple from aggravated assaults.”166
The change in the way police officers looked at aggravated assault resulted in higher
offending rates for those over twenty-five as well.167 All of this suggests that
juveniles are simply not committing more violent acts than before, rather, changes
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that affect a small number of juveniles can have a significant impact on the overall
rate of crime.
Instead of arguing that juveniles are more violent today, Henry H. Brownstein
blames the rise in violent crime between 1985 and 1994 on the rise of the crack
cocaine market.168 The increased production of cocaine during the mid-1980s
resulted in greater availability, lower cost, and higher purity.169 With the increase in
supply, there was a need for a larger market.170 By transforming a small amount of
regular, expensive, cocaine into a large amount of cheaper crack cocaine, the market
was extended to those who could not afford it before.171
At first, the crack market was anything but “organized” crime.172 Since little
money was needed to begin dealing, and users commonly made many stops to their
own personal suppliers (small amounts sold and short lasting effects), a very
competitive atmosphere with many different sellers was created.173 “The earliest
crack markets were dominated by young, inexperienced individuals. . . .”174 In
addition to this competitive and volatile market was the increased availability of
automatic weapons.175 This lethal mixture resulted in an increase in homicide
rates.176 After a few years, as the crack market became more organized, the rate of
juvenile homicides substantially decreased.177
It makes sense that the public may have some misconceptions about the real state
of juvenile crime as it exists today, especially in light of the fact that there seemed to
be an increase in violent juvenile crime between 1986 and 1994. However, it does
not require a great deal of effort to realize that the figures may be misleading and
that there are other factors that contribute to the problem. It is the responsibility of
policy-makers to base their decisions upon sound judgment and analysis of the actual
problem rather than to play on the sentiments of those that elect them. Speeches like
Senator Ashcroft’s, cited at the beginning of this section, perpetuate the myth that
juveniles are different or more violent than they were twenty years ago. Since
juvenile crime has recently decreased overall, we owe it to ourselves to at explore the
reasons why.
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See generally HENRY H BROWNSTEIN, THE RISE AND FALL OF A VIOLENT CRIME WAVE:
CRACK COCAINE AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A CRIME PROBLEM (1996).
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IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JUVENILES AND ADULTS
Adolescents are not permitted to drink, smoke, gamble, or drive until they reach
certain ages. They may not even be permitted to walk the streets at certain times.
Throughout history, juveniles have been treated differently under the law in terms of
their freedoms, responsibilities, and culpability. The Supreme Court sets out the
justification for this treatment in Thompson v. Oklahoma, when it decided that
executing a person under 16 years of age was “cruel and unusual punishment.”178
The Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability
should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious
to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons
why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.179
The following section will explain the cognitive, developmental, and emotional
differences between adults and juveniles that justify a separate system of justice.
This section will help clarify why treating juveniles as adults will only hinder the
achievement of any goal of punishment.
It has been argued that by the age of fourteen, the highest level of cognitive
ability has been achieved.180 At this age, the young person can for the first time think
in abstract ways.181 This is measured by the person’s ability to understand different
alternatives and their consequences.182 Measuring only cognitive development is
usually undertaken in structured settings with few, if any, variables and is thus not a
good indicator of real life capabilities.183
In the real world, this new way of thinking can actually have negative effects on
one who is just learning to master it.184 The fact that the adolescent mind has
physically developed to that of an adult does not mean their skills are equal.185
Adolescents gain the ability to hold many alternatives in mind, but have little
experience in making decisions and a lack of understanding of their own feelings;
therefore, making decisions can be a truly stressful experience.186
178
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In addition to cognitive development, other factors such as the influence of
parents and peers, tendency to disregard risk, and limited perspective of the future,
can affect the way adolescents make decisions.187 All of these elements should be
taken into account when determining how to appropriately address the underlying
causes of juvenile delinquency.
The second ten years of life is a time of intense identity development.188
Adolescents tend to compare themselves to others and measure their own actions
against those around them, namely their peers.189 As a result, factors like the need
for acceptance or peer pressure may affect how decisions are made.190 The effects of
these forces seem to be the strongest at age fourteen and slowly diminish until the
completion of adolescence.191
Another typical result of this insecurity in adolescents is the formation of what
one author has termed the “patchwork self.”192 This occurs when a young person, in
order to adapt to situations which may be unfamiliar or uncomfortable, creates a
personality that is a conglomeration of other people’s “feelings thoughts and beliefs”
in order to blend in.193 This type of person is more susceptible to the influence of
others, and has more difficulty learning from experiences and developing a solid
identity.194
Many young people also lack the ability to fully appreciate the negative impact
their actions may have on their futures.195 This may explain why a young person
may take the immediate gain of committing a criminal act or quitting school while
ignoring the possibility of many years in prison or an undesirable job. Other
disadvantages of youth are inexperience and lack of knowledge.196 A young person
may not realize the true nature of the consequences of his or her actions (horrible
conditions of prison life), even if perfectly aware that crime could result in being sent
to prison. The ability to take future repercussions into account develops throughout
the teenage years and continues “at least into the early twenties.”197
Adolescents may also evaluate risks and benefits of certain behavior with a
completely different system of values than adults.198 This is demonstrated by risky
187
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behavior that may threaten their well being.199 Because of a strong desire for
acceptance at this stage of life, the negative consequences of not following the crowd
may outweigh the negative effects of drugs.200 Further, inexperience or lack of
knowledge may result in simply not realizing negative consequences at all.201
Certain groups of adolescents may be further affected when lack of economic
resources or racism is combined with the characteristics of adolescents just
described.202 Because it is a stage of life where one is struggling to form strong sense
of self worth, having less material wealth or a different cultural background than
others may make this process even more difficult.203 Further, poverty may inhibit
access to proper education or may make the future appear even less important.204
When creating policy that is designed to address the problem of juvenile crime,
the common characteristics of adolescents must be taken into consideration. A
combination of learning to think in a whole new way,205 developing an identity,
experiencing new things, and all of the confusion that goes with it are processes that
differentiate adolescents from adults.206 These are the reasons why adolescents are
less culpable for their decisions and why we treat them differently under the law.207
In addition to being less culpable, most juveniles grow out of the immaturity unique
to this stage of their lives.208 If that is the case, it makes more sense to form juvenile
justice policy aimed at preventing them from making mistakes while young and
irresponsible, so they can develop into productive adults. As the next section will
demonstrate, the trend of the vast majority of states has been to do the exact
opposite.
V. METHODS OF TRANSFER
Forty States have adjusted their transfer statutes, making it easier to try juveniles
in adult court.209 The intended result is to insure harsh penalties, thereby satisfying
society’s need for retribution and public safety.210 As will be discussed in later
portions of this note, the downside of this approach is a complete abandonment of
other goals such as rehabilitation. This section will describe a variety of ways in
which juveniles are transferred to the adult system.
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A. Waiver
Though infrequently used until the 1960s, this method of transfer has been
available for a number of years.211 The three types of waiver are discretionary,
mandatory, and presumptive.212 In all three situations, a hearing must be conducted
before the decision to transfer is made.213
1. Discretionary
Discretionary waiver puts the ultimate decision to transfer in the hands of the
juvenile court judge.214 Generally, the State must first show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the juvenile has met certain criteria.215 Other states may require a
higher standard of proof.216 Whether the young offender was amenable to
rehabilitation has historically been the central focus; however, the decision to
transfer now involves a number of determinations.217 The statutes defining these
criteria are usually a paraphrased version of the factors set out in the appendix to
Kent v. United States.218 Some focus on the nature of the offense (seriousness,
premeditation, violence, whether against persons or property), other factors focus on
the offender (sophistication, maturity, prior record, amenability to rehabilitation),
while others focus on the protection of the community.219 States may decide to add
or delete any of these factors.220 These broad criteria allow flexibility and room for
individual consideration while at the same time give the juvenile court judge some
guidance in deciding on the issue of transfer.221 If the state shows that all of the
criteria set forth in the statute have been met, the judge may still decide that the
situation does not warrant a transfer.222
Most states set the age for discretionary waiver at fourteen to sixteen years old.223
Seventeen states will allow a transfer for specific age groups (if the child is at least
211
Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 102, at 570. Other names for waiver include:
“‘transfer,’ ‘determination of fitness,’ ‘certification,’ ‘reference,’ ‘decline,’ or ‘remand.’”
Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 102, at 570. Ohio uses the term “bind-over” instead of
transfer. Bell, supra note 47, at 213. Throughout this Note, the more general term, transfer, is
used.
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sixteen for example) regardless of the crime that was committed.224 Vermont holds
the record, setting the lowest age at which a juvenile may be sent to adult court under
a discretionary waiver at ten years old.225
2. Mandatory
Like discretionary waiver, mandatory waivers are commenced in the juvenile
justice system, where the juvenile court judge must find that there was probable
cause to believe that certain statutory criteria have been met.226 The difference from
discretionary waiver is that the guidelines are much more specific, focusing on the
age, particular type of crime, certain number of prior offenses as well as other
factors.227 Once the prosecution has met its burden, the judge has no choice but to
transfer.228 Again, the juvenile court judge still has the role of deciding whether the
juvenile meets the criteria for mandatory transfer.229 Fourteen states use this method
of transfer, four allow its use for property offenses, and one state, if certain
conditions are met, requires transfer for any criminal offense.230
3. Presumptive
In a presumptive waiver situation, if the juvenile falls into a certain category of
criteria similar to that in a mandatory waiver situation, there is a rebuttable
presumption that waiver is the appropriate course of action.231 The judge must
transfer if the offender argues unsuccessfully that he or she is rehabilitatable.232 As
with the previous transfer methods, it is still the juvenile court judge that makes the
final determination.233 Fifteen states have employed this type of transfer for
juveniles age fourteen to sixteen.234 Alaska however, attaches a presumption to
children under fourteen for certain violent felonies such as manslaughter and assault
in the first degree.235
B. Direct File and Statutory Exclusion
These types of transfer may be grouped together because they are almost
identical. In both situations, the decision as to the forum in which the juvenile will
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be tried rests in the hands of the prosecutor instead of the judge.236 There is no
hearing on the issue of transfer in these instances because the offender is essentially
going directly to criminal court by virtue of a statute.237 This technique is possible
because a juvenile is not entitled to be tried in juvenile court.238 In a Direct File
situation, the prosecutor has the option to file in criminal or juvenile court based on
factors such as offense, age, and prior history.239 Either court has jurisdiction.240
In states with statutory exclusion, depending on similar factors, only criminal
court may have jurisdiction to hear the case.241 It may seem that in the latter
situation, the prosecutor has no discretion. However, since many offenses can fall
under a number of classifications in terms of severity, the choice is still in the hands
of the prosecutor.242 If a juvenile is arrested for a homicide, the prosecutor may,
depending on the circumstances, file charges under differing degrees of murder
thereby making the choice of forum.243
The Direct File method of transfer exists in fifteen states.244 Statutes that
automatically exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of juvenile court exist in
twenty-eight states.245 Idaho, New York, and Vermont automatically exclude a
fourteen-year-old from the jurisdiction of juvenile court for property offenses.246
Wisconsin will automatically try a ten-year-old in criminal court for murder.247
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C. “Once an Adult/Always an Adult”248
This type of transfer requires a separate category because it is the only method
that eliminates all discretion from both the juvenile court judge and the prosecutor.249
If the offender has been adjudicated in a criminal court on a prior occasion, he or she
will automatically be tried in criminal court for any subsequent offense, regardless of
how minor it may be.250 Thirty-one states have this provision written into their
transfer statutes.251
Altogether, the homicide rate, while dropping rapidly in the last five years,
increased during the period between the mid 1980s and early 1990s.252 This is often
cited as the justification for the new transfer statutes that were enacted.253 However,
many states (twenty-one), have statutes that transfer juveniles for non-violent
property offenses.254 In fact, “most children sent to adult court are property
offenders”.255 There are also many statutes that allow for transfer for any crime once
the offender has reached a certain age.256 Some even transfer for misdemeanors.257
Therefore, even if we are in the midst of an era of violent juveniles, it appears that
many types of transfer statutes fail to properly address the problem.
VI. OHIO’S TRANSFER STATUTES
Although “care, protection, and mental and physical development of children”
has remained the purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system over the last thirty years, the
laws themselves have changed.258 Ohio has addressed the problem of juvenile crime
in a similar fashion as the forty other states, which have drafted statutes making it
easier to try juveniles in the adult criminal system.259 Ohio has not, however,
adopted any other form other than the waiver.260 On January 1, 1996, Ohio’s new
juvenile crime law went into effect, changing the age and conditions under which a
juvenile could be transferred to adult court.261
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Under the previous law, both discretionary and mandatory transfer provisions
existed.262 The discretionary transfer provision stated that if a juvenile allegedly
committed a crime that would be classed as a felony if committed by an adult, the
child could be transferred to criminal court if three elements were satisfied.263 First,
the child had to be at least fifteen.264 Second, there had to be probable cause to
believe the child committed the act.265 Finally, the case could be transferred if there
were reasonable grounds to believe the child was not amenable to treatment and that
the safety of society required it.266 Once these three elements were demonstrated, the
decision to transfer was still up to the discretion of the juvenile court judge.267
The second part of the old statute provided some additional factors for the judge
to consider, such as whether the victim was over sixty-five or physically disabled or
subject to a crime of violence.268 The Rules of Juvenile Procedure listed factors to
provide the judge some guidance in determining whether it was reasonable to believe
that the child was not amenable to treatment.269 Some of these factors include: age,
mental conditions, prior record, family environment, and school record.270 Many of
the factors resemble those listed in Kent v. United States.271 It was only mandatory
for the judge to transfer if there was probable cause to believe that a juvenile, who
had previously been adjudicated a delinquent child for murder, had again committed
murder.272
The new statute lowered the age for both mandatory and discretionary transfer
and expanded the circumstances under which a judge has no choice but to transfer.273
The discretionary section of the new statute is similar to the old. The three
requirements are identical except for the age, which was lowered from fifteen to
fourteen.274 Additional factors for the judge to consider have been added, such as
whether the victim was five years old or younger, whether a gun was used, or
whether any physical harm resulted.275 Finally, the list of substantive factors
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(mentioned previously) relating to amenability to rehabilitation was eliminated from
the juvenile rules of criminal procedure, leaving only procedural requirements.276
The largest change occurred with the mandatory transfer sections. If there is
probable cause to believe a 14-year-old child committed any criminal act, the
juvenile court judge must transfer if the child was previously found guilty of a felony
in adult court.277 Ohio is the only state with such a provision.278 If there is probable
cause to believe a child (fourteen years or older) committed aggravated murder or
murder, he or she must be transferred if previously found guilty of murder or other
enumerated felonies and committed to the Department of Youth Services.279
If the juvenile has reached sixteen years of age, transfer becomes even easier.280
If there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed aggravated murder
or murder, the judge must transfer.281 Transfer is also mandatory if there is probable
cause to believe the juvenile committed felonies such as aggravated robbery,
aggravated burglary, or kidnapping with the use of a firearm.282 Finally, if the charge
is as serious as murder or aggravated murder, the child must be transferred if
previously committed to the Department of Youth Services for either a murder or a
felony.283
VII. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
This section will begin with an analysis of whether Ohio’s current transfer statute
reflects a sound understanding of lessons learned from history, the real state of
juvenile crime, and the cognitive, developmental, and emotional characteristics of
adolescents. It will also provide an explanation of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing
Commission’s alternative to transfer. Finally, this note will conclude with some
further recommendations for change.
A. Analysis of Ohio’s Changes
The past shows that there are costs and benefits to different approaches to
juvenile crime.284 One interpretation of history supports the view that the juvenile
courts of today have drifted away from the judicial discretion and procedural
informality that made rehabilitation and treatment a reality.285 Another interpretation
supports the idea that overly broad and unguided judicial discretion resulted in
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arbitrariness, while informal proceedings were neither beneficial, nor an intentional
alternative to achieving the goal of rehabilitation.286
Ohio’s statute combines the worst of both worlds. First, by expanding the reach
of its mandatory transfer,287 this State has moved further away from taking into
consideration the different characteristics of each juvenile and their varying degrees
of culpability. Conversely, by eliminating some of the guidelines in the Juvenile
Rules of Criminal Procedure for discretionary transfer,288 the juvenile court judge has
fewer factors under which to guide a decision, thus broadening the discretion of each
individual judge.
Similar to many state juvenile transfer statutes written during the same period,
the new Ohio transfer statute was the result of exaggerated juvenile crime
statistics.289 If juvenile crime has indeed reached astronomical levels, the need to
protect society may outweigh the possible benefits of rehabilitation;290 however, the
fact that this statute went into effect three years after juvenile crime began to drop291
shows that Ohio has incorrectly balanced these interests. To properly address the
actual state of juvenile crime, rehabilitation should have been given greater
emphasis.
The Ohio statute, with deterrence as one of its underlying justifications for
harsher punishment,292 disregards the true nature of adolescents, namely, their
inability to fully appreciate future consequences.293 Consequently, the threat of being
tried in an adult court will not have the impact upon juvenile decision-making as
may be expected. The Supreme Court discussed deterrent value of the most serious
punishment imaginable, the sentence of death, upon a fifteen-year-old boy in
Thompson v. Oklahoma.294 The Court noted “the likelihood that the teenage offender
has made the kind of cold-blooded, cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to
the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. . . .”295 It
would logically follow then that if death will unlikely deter this group of offenders,
neither would the threat of adult punishment.
Finally, the statute, with its mandatory transfer provisions, rather than solving the
juvenile crime problem, may end up making it worse.296 If a juvenile, who is
amenable to rehabilitation, is transferred and sentenced in an adult prison to mix with
adult criminals, there may be negative ramifications for the future of the child, safety
286
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of society, and the community’s resources.297 Young offenders sent to adult
institutions are exposed to the mistreatment and negative influence of older
offenders.298 The likely, but unfortunate result is not the reformation of the prisoner,
but a transformation into a hardened criminal.299 Additionally, unless the offender
has committed first degree murder, he or she will eventually be set free to once again
pose a threat to community safety. Community resources will be spent on further
efforts in apprehending and once again incarcerating the recidivist offender.300
B. A New Idea
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission has come up with a new approach to
dealing with serious juvenile offenders. It proposes that Ohio give the juvenile court
judge the power to impose adult sentences as an alternative to transferring the
offender to adult court.301 This plan also expands the age boundaries of those subject
to the juvenile system in both directions.302 The maximum age for juvenile court
jurisdiction would be extended from twenty-one to twenty-five, while the minimum
age would drop from twelve to ten years old.303 Another part to this plan proposes
suspending an adult prison sentence while the offender serves in the juvenile
system.304 The adult sentence would be invoked if the offender does not reform.305
This plan presents a unique approach to juvenile crime that may improve the system
that exists today; however, it is not without faults. There are negative aspects that
need to be resolved before the proposal could ever be put into effect.
A possible advantage of this plan is that it would replace the practice of
mandatory waiver.306 Accordingly, the juvenile court judge would always be the one
to determine the course of action most appropriate for each individual. This will
prevent minor offenders who may be amenable to treatment from being
automatically sent to criminal court.
This plan would also solve the problems associated with punishing the most
serious young offenders under the current system. For example, if an extremely
violent juvenile is sent to the Department of Youth Services, first, he will have little
or no incentive to improve, knowing that release is imminent on his twenty-first
birthday. Second, society’s need for retribution will not be satisfied by what appears
to be a light sentence imposed for a serious offense. On the other hand, if the harsh
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sentence is imposed and the juvenile is sent to criminal court, all possibility for
rehabilitation is lost and he emerges from incarceration as a career criminal.
The proposal establishes a middle ground solution. The juvenile, knowing he
will be sent to adult prison for a long period of time if he does not change his ways,
will have some incentive to improve. Further, society will be more satisfied with a
mandatory stay until his twenty-fifth birthday and the possible imposition of an adult
sentence if rehabilitation fails.
The downside of this proposal is the immense amount of unguided discretion in
the juvenile court judge. Arbitrariness may result if the judge has no guidance
regarding the factors to consider (age, background, etc…) when imposing a sentence.
There also needs to be limits upon the sentence he or she may impose. Further, if the
judge has the ability to hand down adult sentences, all of the procedural protections
of the adult criminal court must be made available in the juvenile system as well,
including the right to a trial by jury. The consequence could be an adversarial
juvenile system, identical to the adult court, focusing on punishment instead of
rehabilitation.
C. Recommendations
The following recommendations for adjusting the juvenile justice system
incorporate lessons learned from history, a realistic view of the crime problem, and
the developmental characteristics of juveniles. These considerations are essential
elements in formulating sound juvenile justice policy. The recommendations also
incorporate the idea that it is possible to have a system that combines the procedural
fairness of an adult court proceeding, guided judicial discretion, and the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system.
As proposed by the Sentencing Commission, it is necessary that the juvenile
courts broaden the age of those subject to their jurisdiction. A longer period of time
spent in the juvenile justice system may provide more of an opportunity for
intervention while satisfying society’s need for retribution and avoiding the
disadvantages of adult prisons. A broader range of juvenile court jurisdiction to
younger ages will also enable the system to intervene at an earlier point in the child’s
life when rehabilitation may be most effective.
When it comes to the guilt or innocence determination, the juvenile court should
be procedurally identical to the adult criminal court. As discussed previously in this
Note, it is unclear whether procedural informality was a necessary or even an
intended means to achieve the goal of rehabilitation. There is no reason to believe
that the focus on rehabilitation will be lost by the addition of fair proceedings. How
a court goes about determining guilt should have no bearing upon what is best for
that child once that determination has been made. Flexibility may be a factor in the
sentencing or treatment decision.
Procedural protections will also make possible the suggestion by the Sentencing
Commission that Ohio abandon transfer altogether. Once a juvenile has been found
guilty of a particular offense, the juvenile court judge is in the best position to decide
what is the most appropriate course of action because, unlike a statute, he or she can
take into account the individual characteristics of each juvenile. This discretion
should be guided by factors such as age, prior history, background, and family
environment. There should also be limitations on the length and conditions of
certain punishments, especially for particularly young offenders.
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Again, it is not the procedures that differentiate these two systems, it is the
underlying goals.307 The criminal system has for the most part given-up on
rehabilitation and focused entirely on retribution and incapacitation.308 As long as
the juvenile court system keeps rehabilitation as its objective, it will maintain its
identity.309
VIII. CONCLUSION
One does not need to look very long before finding newspaper articles
expounding upon all of the new and horrible crimes committed by juveniles. It is
also not difficult to find a politician clamoring about how much worse young people
are today while using these stories as justification for a harsh juvenile policy that has
not been thoroughly evaluated. In the wake of misconceived public sentiment about
the state of juvenile crime today, states have been adjusting their statutes to punish
more juveniles as adults. Because of the nature of juveniles, this approach does little
to advance any goal of the criminal system aside from punishment and retribution.
The juvenile court is, and should remain, the proper forum for young offenders, no
matter how serious the crime. Until it is accepted that procedural due process may
coexist with the goal of rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system, alternatives to
transfer will never be a possibility.
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